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ABSTRACT 
Family-owned business groups have long dominated the East Asian corporate landscape. This paper looks 
at the dominance of business groups in the Philippines and tries to explain their dominance by their role 
as filling the institutional voids left by government due to decades of political and economic instability. 
The paper also discusses the applicability of agency theory in the country. Finally, the paper looks at the 
downside to this common form of corporate organizing and how family businesses reflect the oligarchical 
nature of the country’s stratified society.  
KEYWORDS: Business groups, family businesses, institutional voids, agency theory, corporate 
governance, developing economies 
BACKGROUND 
The private sector of the Philippines is largely dominated by family-owned conglomerates or business 
groups (Granovetter 2001, Claessens et al 2000) and small family-run businesses. Indeed, ownership and 
control is rarely separated in the Philippines. The dominance of the family permeates throughout the 
private sector from the large listed corporation to the corner store. This paper relates the evidence of 
business groups and their attitude towards listing and corporate governance. 
METHODOLOGY  
Compared to previous research that have in large part been quantitative and qualitative case studies 
surveys into Philippines corporate governance, this research uses the ethnographic method to discover the 
profound impact of corporate governance reforms on family-owned firms. The design of my research was 
qualitative in order to gain a richer, profound and wider understanding that mere statistics could not 
unveil. Indeed, Claessens et al (2000) quantitative study provides an indication but not an explanation of 
why concentration of family corporate ownership in the Philippines and other parts of East Asia are high.  
 
Forty interviews were conducted in 2007 in situ in the Philippines with senior executives of the country’s 
listed and owners of unlisted corporations supplemented by participant observation and local media 
content analysis as part of a broader research into the impact of corporate governance reforms in the 
country. In particular, the research sought to answer the following question: “What was the impact of 
corporate governance reforms in the country?” and whether such reforms were happening in form and/or 
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substance. These reforms were based upon the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999, 2004) 
formulated for listed companies who have widely dispersed owners in developed countries. In the 
Philippines, the business environment is the opposite - most listed companies are partially listed and 
owned by major blockholders such as families, and the country’s institutional framework is still 
underdeveloped and the political environment is unstable Throughout the data collection, inductive 
aspects of the research sought to uncover reasons for the divergence and the limitations of Anglo-
American corporate governance reforms. The dominance of family-owned businesses in the country mean 
corporate governance reforms and their pragmatic application must be taken into the context of this 
situation.  
 
The interview data (mostly face-to-face with some lasting up to three hours long) were transcribed and 
inputted in the NViVo Qualitative Research Program. Nodes were done in an inductive manner and some 
50 nodes were generated covering issues relating to family businesses. The screenshots below shows the 
free nodes relating to family-owner issues such as 15 nodes for business groups: 
<INSERT DIAGRAM 1 HERE> 
For ease of search, free nodes were used in the NViVo program instead of tree nodes. For the business 
group nodes, 12 nodes were exclusively related to family-owned business groups while the rest were for 
non-family and theoretical aspects of business group theories. The tree chart below is a summary of the 
categories of 15 business group nodes: 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
THE DOMINANCE OF FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS GROUPS 
Family-owned business groups are the dominant form of economic organisation in the Philippines: 
“Most of the businesses in the Philippines are controlled by single family groups. This, of course, 
poses challenges to an effective overall corporate governance framework.” – holding company 
interviewee 
Granovetter’s definition of business groups is applied here:  
“One can consider as business groups those collections of firms bound together in some formal 
and/or informal ways, characterised by an 'intermediate' level of binding.” (2001: 69) 
In the case of South Korea and indeed the Philippines, business groups are so defined as: 
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“…they are the outcome of investments by a single family or small number of allied families 
who, once having acquired the component companies, keep them together as a coherent group 
among which personnel and resources may be shifted as needed. Yet the individual companies 
continue to keep some separate identity.” (2001: 70) 
Or more intimately as one put it 
“…the company is the extension of the family” – private sector interviewee 
Family owned business groups in a weak state have the advantage over other forms of economic 
organizing due to the speed in which decisions are made: 
“The advantage [of family corporations] is quick decisions are made faster. The view is long term 
and not short-term decisions. There is closer coordination with exceptions…In the Asian culture, 
if you look at which are the successful entities, most of the successful ones are family owned 
corporations. They decide fast, they look long-term. If you’re [not family run], you tend to look 
on the short term, short-term return/run. If you’re a family corporations, you look in 5 years, 10 
years time. You can’t compare developed countries and developing countries.” – holding 
company 
“The nature of family corporations here, to what extent is it cultural to have family corporations 
practice? US theory tend to look down on family corporations. The tendency to assume that 
family corporations or family controlled firms are necessarily inferior to other forms overlooks 
the evolution of corporate forms and management practice that they’re superior to.” - academic 
Thus, in this work, the umbrella term ‘business groups’ cover other colloquialisms such as family 
corporations (FAMCORs) and commercial industrial groups (CIGs). Business groups in the Philippines 
are characterised by kinship ties with ownership dominated by one owner and/or one family. Some 
business groups have history and generational legacy on their side, others are new entrepreneurs. The 
phenomenon of old money versus new money is not unfamiliar in the Philippines: 
“The Sys founded and grew [their business]. This is the same with the Gokongweis. They started 
from below. The Ayalas have always been there for long, long time now. New players such as 
Andrew Tan, Lucio Tan, George Ty. Ty’s family wasn’t poor as he built from previous wealth, 
invested it and spin-off its growth. Jo Concepcion (RFM) was there after the war – a spin-off 
from a separate organisation.” – private sector (2) 
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The following table from Forbes Asia shows the richest 25 individuals/families in the country with their 
business interests and/or affiliations: 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
The business group structure in the country is vertically integrated reflecting a great degree of control by 
owners: 
“...groups in the Philippines are far more vertically integrated than groups in India and far more 
involved in financial services than groups in Thailand.” Khanna and Yafeh (2007: 333) 
Indeed the Philippine experience is the norm with the corporate landscape of East Asia dominated by 
business groups: 
“[The Philippine business groups is] not dissimilar to family corporate entities with the exception 
of Japan and Korea. Most of the region has companies where control is in one large company. 
[We] mimic models of publicly listed companies, when control blocks [are] put together (such as 
Hutchinson Whampoa Kai Sheng), the Philippines is no exception – the Ayalas, SMC. What is 
underlying [this] is the ability of families to recognise developments.” – private sector 
“business groups will continue to be important vehicles for the sustained future growth of this 
region.” (Chang 2003: 414) 
Why business groups should exist, evolve and be the common form of private sector organising in the 
region has been a source of rigorous debate. Different theories proffer different perspectives to their 
enduring existence as the table below that has been adapted from Chung (2005) summarises:  
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
In the case of the Philippines, as a developing economy, the above table does provide several indicators 
why business groups should dominate the economic landscape in the country. The Philippines has less 
than satisfactory regulatory institutions. With a dominant public sector and executive, business groups 
create a form of organising that tries to mitigate uncertainty. The Philippines has a developing capital 
market, and the lack of trust in judicial remedy is widespread. By being part of a business group, 
transaction costs between affiliated companies are lower theoretically. However this could be up-ended 
should a dominant shareholder seek to use these relationships for other uses than business efficiency. The 
might of business groups and conglomerate power also allows competitive advantage over single firms. 
As business groups dominate industries, being affiliated with a business group allows a company access 
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to the network and resources available within that group. Being part of a business group builds up and 
consolidates the social capital amongst members. 
APPLICABILITY OF AGENCY THEORY 
The common principal-agent problem common in Anglo-American countries are not present in the 
Philippines as most owners are they themselves part of management. In most cases, the control of 
business groups has not been decoupled from the owners. For some agency theorists such as Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), they argue that in lieu of the principal-agent problem, Agency Problem II therefore 
exists – between that of the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders where: 
“The large shareholder may use its controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits at 
the expense of the small shareholders. If the large shareholder is an institution such as a bank, an 
investment fund, or a widely held corporation, the private benefits of control are diluted among 
several independent owners.  (2006: 387) 
Thus, while the common agency theory is overcome in that managers are kept on a tight leash by owners 
in a family owned business group, agency theory II provokes the problem of minority shareholder 
expropriation as the majority owners are so dominant. 
In Anglo-American corporate governance, a blockholder or major shareholder is considered to be one 
who owns around 5% of total ownership. In the Philippines, a 5% ownership is considered a very minor 
stake. Most groups would have a blockholder that would own at least over 50% of the company so control 
is supreme. Thus in the Philippines, the Anglo-American agency problems on corporate governance 
between principal-agent is rarely an issue. Agency theory can only be applied in companies where there is 
widely dispersed ownership, not concentrated ones:  
“To balance the major shareholder’s interests of shareholder intent is realistic - it’s human nature. 
Agency corporate governance Issues here are different. It is important in the US [the] the 
principal-agent problem. There’s no agency problem here. There’s no situation here where the 
biggest shareholder owns 5%. It doesn’t happen. There’s a controlling shareholder, a block 
ownership and minority shareholders.” – economist 
Most of my interviewees spoke about the major owners and the percentage of ownership they have. Seen 
from an Anglo-American context, the extent of their control is staggering: 
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“The dominant family is the Montinolos. They have 40% ownership of the shares, the next is the 
SM Corporation (Henry Sy) which has 24%. There are foreign investors and although they would 
like to invest in FEU there are not many shares available.” – FEU 
 “We have two main shareholder groups: Hong-Kong based First Pacific (private investment 
group) and Japan’s NTT Comm (landline) and Docomo (wireless) NTT representatives are here 
as well with NTT within advisers within the company in an advisory capacity. Our notable 
shareholders are Philippine Telecoms, Metro Pacific, SSS, NTT Comm, NTT Docomo, JP 
Morgan.” – PLDT 
“Ayala Corporation is 51% owned by the holding company of the Ayala Family named Mermac.  
10% owned by Mitsubishi. The rest is owned by the public. There are foreign investors: 20% of 
outstanding shares, around 15-20%” – Ayala 
“[T]here are two major shareholders at 40% each and the remaining 20% is widely distributed 
among individuals, firms, Filipino or foreign.” – Petron 
As one pointed out, having big blocks mean a great deal of control and influence is exercised: 
“Once you get that size, a shareholder block of around 35% the block is still in control due to the 
sheer amount of money involved. We are still a relatively small company so if we list at all the 
number of shareholders will be spread out. One shareholder has a 20% ownership but there isn’t 
one shareholder that has control. They are all buddies. We’re generating money on our ROI so we 
can’t access it (the shareholder value) the capital requirements that we have.” – unlisted company 
Classical agency theory is not supported in the country’s corporations as ownership and control are-  in 
fact -  the same, but there is some support for what Villalonga and Amit’s call agency problem two. 
Business Groups as Filling the Institutional Void 
In the Philippines, business groups have filled the institutional void normally reserved for government. A 
weak government with a limited amount of resources which does not have the efficiency to apply them to 
its utmost effectiveness, does not have the capability to fulfil all its institutional and infrastructure 
obligations: 
“More generally, due to their broad scope, business groups can facilitate development by 
internalizing public infrastructure in regions where the provision of public goods is poor (Fisman 
& Khanna, 2004). For example, India’s largest business groups have created self-contained 
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industrial cities providing their own essential infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, 
electrical power, schools and medical facilities. The strategy offers access to low cost factors of 
production (land, labor) and in turn catalyzes economic development in the surrounding area.” 
(Carney 2008: 598) 
In Manila, business groups have visibly filled this institutional void in the development of the central 
business districts of Makati and Mandaluyong. Indeed, several comments were made to me during my 
fieldwork compared and contrasted how the landowners developed these two business districts with 
minimal contribution from the state. However, while they fulfil part of the institutional void, business 
groups themselves are not substitutes for government nor do they wish to be substitutes for government. 
A sentiment I would hear include comments such as “We are doing what government is suppose to be 
doing. This is suppose to be their job, not ours.” Business groups and their owning families  - at least the 
ones I interviewed – showed little desire to rule the country even though their economic interests rival 
that of the state. 
Business Groups – Paragons or Parasites? 
The mixed view of business groups as paragons or parasites were expounded upon by Khanna and Yafeh 
in their 2007 provocative article. However, the authors show that business groups’ behaviour cannot be 
generalised. As business groups are also a reflection of the owning and controlling family’s values, 
opinions vary. It is not as black and white as the title of their article suggests. The murky developing 
environment of the Philippines opens up the compelling shades of grey and battles between good and the 
not-so-evil are often represented.  
Which business groups are worthy of trust and investing in, and which ones are dominated by a family or 
founder and where insider trading dominates? Which ones practice good corporate governance and which 
ones do not? 
The business group paragons are the ones who have a good reputation premium and practice good 
corporate governance. (Carney 2008: 597) The parasitic business groups practice not so good corporate 
governance and depend largely on the largesse of their political connections to sustain the viability of 
their companies. 
Downsides to this Dominance 
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There is a downside to the dominance of business groups in the Philippines. The private sector is an 
uneven playing field between affiliated companies and unaffiliated companies overlooked by government 
which enforces rules and regulations haphazardly and inconsistently: 
“Certainly there is an uneven playing field. It remains a serious problem. This family-based form 
of economic power translates into familial politics. It’s an issue of control that’s why the stock 
market hasn’t developed. There are conglomerate problems: walls dividing various aspects of 
investment and banking not followed.” -academic 
The domination of business groups also deters continuous investment and deters competition: 
“Most companies are owned by families, there is limited liquidity.” – private sector (1) 
“There is no way to do business [in the Philippines] without working with family business. Look 
at Metrobank. Schools , colleges are owned by families – other than religious orders. No sector in 
this economy that is not dominated by a family business. It makes us difficult to move, to grow. 
[Their] size makes you work with family networks and connections.” -academic interviewee 
For foreign entrants, if they have not been deterred by the ownership restrictions, they face an uphill 
challenge to enter sectors which are dominated by certain business groups: 
“The top oligarchies here of which there are 12 organisations are diverse in their holdings, so for 
a large foreign group to challenge that, it’d be difficult.” – consultant  
Affiliating and allying with a business group allows them a foot in the door. Indeed, that was an 
observation made to me on how to do business in the country. The business groups are reflective of the 
oligarchic nature of the country: 
 “People who affect the life of the country (political intellectual circle) is very limited. Elitist.” – 
private sector (1) 
Internally, a business group structure of inter-affiliated companies fosters a culture of insider information. 
This is an obstacle to transparency which makes it difficult for the capital market to function properly: 
“Guys who own company have superior information (owners are insiders – unlike Anglo 
American – the insiders are managers). [You need to] increase the right information provided to 
make an informed judgement and not be taken for a ride.” – private sector  (2) 
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Therefore, corporate governance in the country is limited and promoted by the interests of business 
groups.  The business groups which make up the majority of the real economy of the Philippines still 
resolutely hold and control the power in their companies.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper sought to relate the dominance of business groups, their role in filling institutional voids and 
the applicability of agency theory in the country. For the foreseeable future, business groups will continue 
to dominate the private sector landscape of the country and corporate governance in the Philippines will 
be applied, altered, supported (or not) and shaped by the owners of these groups.  
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Diagram 1: Screenshot of Business Group Nodes in NVivo version 8.0 
 




Figure 1 Business Group Nodes categorised 
 





Table 1: 25 Richest Individuals/Families in the Philippines in 20091 
Rank Name Business Group Affiliation / Interests Net Worth 
(USDM) 
1 Henry Sy SM Investment Corporation 3800 
2 Lucio Tan PNB, PAL, Asia Brewery  1700 
3 Jaime Zobel de Ayala Ayala Corporation 1200 
4 Andrew Tan Alliance Global Group, Megaworld 850 
5 John Gokongwei JG Summit 720 
6 Tony Tan Caktiong Jollibee Foods 710 
7 Eduardo Cojuangco Jr San Miguel Brewery 660 
8 Enrique Razon Jr Container Terminal Services 620 
9 Manuel Villar Vista Land; Philippine Senate President 530 
10 George Ty Metrobank 515 
11 Emilio Yap Philtrust Bank 510 
12 Iñigo & Mercedes Zobel Mermac 440 
13 Beatrice Campos Unilab 410 
14 Vivian Que Azcona Mercury Drug 390 
15 Oscar Lopez Lopez Group 350 
16 Andrew Gotianun FilInvest Development 310 
17 David Consunjui DMCI Holdings 300 
18 Robert Coyiuto Jr Oriental Petroleum and Minerals 290 
19 Alfonso Yuchengco Yuchengco Group of Companies 230 
20 Mariano Tan Unilab 180 
21 Menardo Jimenez GMA Network 160 
22 Gilberto M. Duavit GMA Network 159 
23 Felipe Gozon GMA Network 135 
24 Jon Ramon Aboitiz Aboitiz Equity Ventures 125 
25 Betty Ang Monde Nissin 120 
                                                          
1
 Forbes (2009) The Philippines’ 40 Richest, Forbes Asia, August 25, 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/86/philippines-billionaires-09_The-Philippines-40-Richest_Rank.html accessed 
19 October 2009 




Table 2: Different theoretical perspectives on development of business groups in developing 
economies (adapted from Chung 2005: 67) 
Institutional 
theory 
Institutional theory asserts that highly diversified BGs create value by compensating 
for a nation’s inefficient capital, labor, and product markets (Clague 1997; Coase 




Market failure theory, concurring with institutional theory, argues that external 
markets can fail due to inefficient market mechanisms, legal impediments, and lack of 
trust (Collis and Montgomery 2005; Klein et al. 1978). 
Transaction 
cost theory 
Transaction cost theory argues that internal business transactions lower transaction 
costs because they avoid costs associated with contracts, negotiations, and contract 





Resource-based theory asserts that BG-affiliated companies have opportunities to 
acquire and accumulate valuable resources, such as industry entry skills, trained 
employees, managerial skills, export-related skills, and others, giving them resource 





Social capital theory proposes that intra-firm networks such as BG companies are 
social capital that can facilitate value creation (Alder and Kwon 2002; Baker 1990; 
Das and Teng 2002; Portes 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). 
Agency 
theory 
Agency theory argues that because BGs are owned and managed by founder families, 
agency problems are minimized between professional managers and shareholders. 
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